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Why Does the Law of One Price Fail? 





Abstract: Experimental subjects review four S&P 500 index fund prospectuses and then 
allocate $10,000 across those funds. We randomly select subjects to be paid for their 
subsequent portfolio performance. Subjects cannot access any non-portfolio services such as 
financial advice from their selected funds. Nevertheless, they overwhelmingly fail to 
minimize their index fund fees. When we make fund fees salient and transparent, subjects’ 
portfolios shift towards lower-fee index funds, but over 80% still do not invest all of their 
money in the lowest-fee fund. When funds’ annualized returns since inception are made 
salient, portfolios shift towards index funds with higher returns since inception, even though 
variation in these returns is irrelevant for forecasting future returns. We present evidence that 
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 “S&P 500 index funds are mutual funds whose goal is to mirror the return of the S&P 
500 index. The underlying portfolios of these funds are similar to commodities because they 
hold essentially identical portfolios of securities. However, like many other end-products that are 
based on commodities, S&P 500 index funds themselves are not commodities. These funds 
differ from one another through the services that are packaged with their securities portfolios 
and through other characteristics. Differences in services and characteristics allow mutual funds 
to appeal to the needs of a wide range of investors.”  
Sean Collins, Investment Company Institute (2005, p. 2) 
 
Mutual fund fees vary by an order of magnitude across firms even though the industry 
has hundreds of competing firms. Moreover, there is scant evidence that more expensive funds 
pick stocks well enough to offset their fees (e.g. Carhart, 1997; Gruber, 1996).
1 Some authors 
have argued that investors should not choose high-fee funds, particularly in the index fund 
market, where the underlying portfolio is a commodity (Elton, Gruber, and Busse, 2004). 
Industry trade groups have responded by arguing that variation in services, such as financial 
advice or complementary investment instruments, explains the variation in fees (Collins, 2005). 
Academic economists have explained the demand for high fee funds with search cost models 
(Sirri and Tufano, 1998) and models that combine search costs and services (Hortaçsu and 
Syverson, 2004). 
We report experiments that shed light on these theories of the demand for high-fee 
mutual funds. In our first experiment, we give subjects four S&P 500 index fund prospectuses 
and ask them to allocate $10,000 among these funds. To make choices incentive-compatible, we 
randomly select subjects who will receive the next year’s return from their hypothetical portfolio 
(if that return is positive).
2 The selected subjects do not actually make investments in their 
chosen funds. Hence, subjects’ returns are completely unbundled from any fund services. 
Despite our eliminating the role of fund services, subjects continue to choose high-fee portfolios. 
We test the role of search costs by eliminating them in one of our experimental 
treatments. In this transparency treatment, subjects receive the four fund prospectuses as well as 
a one-page sheet that summarizes the four index funds’ fees. The fee summary sheet causes 
investments to shift toward lower-cost index funds relative to control subjects who received only 
                                                 
1 Wermers (2000) finds that high turnover funds—which tend to charge higher fees—outperform low turnover funds 
after expenses if one does not adjust for beta, size, momentum, and value effects. However, he does not perform a 
comparable analysis that sorts directly on expenses instead of turnover. 
2 If the return is negative, no payments are made.   4
prospectuses. However, over 80% of transparency treatment subjects still fail to minimize index 
fund fees. 
We also study another treatment in which subjects receive the four prospectuses and a 
summary sheet that shows each index fund’s annualized returns since inception. Because each 
fund’s inception date differs, this information should be ignored when predicting across-fund 
variation in future index fund returns. In fact, we construct our fund menu so that annualized 
returns since inception are positively correlated with fees; chasing past returns since inception 
lowers future returns. Nevertheless, this is what our subjects do. 
Our experimental subjects are probably better-equipped than most investors to make 
sophisticated investment decisions. The bulk of the participants are elite MBA students at 
Wharton. The remaining subjects are college students recruited on the Harvard campus. Our 
MBA subjects report an average combined SAT score of 1453, which is at the 98th percentile 
nationally, and our college subjects reported an average score of 1499, which is at the 99th 
percentile.
3 When we measure financial literacy directly, we find that these subjects are more 
knowledgeable than the typical American investor. 
We also run a second experiment that has a similar structure and yields similar results. In 
this experiment, the four funds in the investment menu are actively managed small cap value 
funds. We only administer the control treatment (subjects receive only the prospectuses) and the 
fee transparency treatment (subjects receive the prospectuses and a sheet summarizing mutual 
fund fees). The subjects are elite college, law, and MBA students taking a class at the University 
of Pennsylvania. 
These experiments lead us to the following description of mutual fund investing: 
1)  Many people do not realize that mutual fund fees are important in making an 
investment decision. Therefore, it is unlikely that their search effort is directed towards 
finding fees. In our index fund experiment, college students in the control group ranked 
fees as only the eighth most important factor in their decision out of eleven factors. Their 
mean fee was 122 basis points above the possible minimum. In the actively managed 
fund experiment, expense ratios were also ranked eighth by the control group, whose 
mean fee was 56 basis points above the possible minimum.   5
2)  The subset of investors that realizes fees are important often cannot accurately 
identify the fee information in the prospectus. The MBAs in the index fund experiment 
control condition ranked fees as the most important factor in their decision. However, 
despite the disparity in how the MBA and college students ranked the importance of fees, 
the MBAs’ average fee was only 10 basis points below the college students’ average, a 
statistically insignificant difference. 
3)  Making fee information transparent reduces allocations to high-cost funds. In both 
the index fund experiment and the actively managed fund experiment (where higher fees 
could signal greater stock-picking skill), subjects in the fee transparency treatment 
selected lower-cost portfolios than control subjects. Fee transparency caused MBA 
portfolio fees to drop more than college portfolio fees, consistent with MBAs placing 
more importance on fees. Making fees transparent also causes subjects to report that fees 
are more important.  
4)  Even when fee information is transparent, investors do not invest in the lowest-fee 
fund. In the index fund experiment, providing the fee summary sheet does not drive the 
chosen portfolios to the minimum-cost boundary, even among the MBAs. Therefore, 
search costs alone do not fully account for the willingness to hold high-fee index funds. 
Subjects instead seem to value non-fee attributes of index funds. However, in our 
experiment, services should not matter, since the subjects do not receive any services. 
Hence, subjects may be attracted by brand names, even when the brands are stripped of 
any service differential. 
5)  Investors are swayed by salient but irrelevant returns information. Providing the 
returns summary sheet to index fund experiment subjects caused them to chase historical 
returns. College subjects responded more to the returns summary sheet than the MBAs, 
consistent with college students placing more importance on past returns. Because we 
had selected funds such that annualized returns since inception were positively correlated 
with fees, returns-chasing behavior decreased expected returns. The historical returns of 
funds are the focus of much mutual fund advertising and media coverage (Jain and Wu 
(2000), Sapp and Tiwari (2004), Cronqvist (2004), Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005)). 
                                                                                                                                                             
3 These averages are consistent with the school-wide statistics publicly reported by the universities. See 
http://www.collegeboard.com/prod_downloads/about/news_info/cbsenior/yr2005/02_v&m_composite_percentile_ra  6
6)  Investors in high-cost index funds have some sense that they are making a mistake. 
In the index fund experiment, higher fees are paid by subjects who report having less 
confidence that their choice is optimal for them, a higher likelihood of changing their 
portfolio in response to professional investment advice, and less general investment 
knowledge. 
 
Our results support a growing body of evidence that individual investors are not well-
equipped to make optimal asset allocation choices in the current regulatory environment (see, for 
example, Benartzi and Thaler, 2001; Cronqvist and Thaler, 2004; Choi et al. 2004; Cronqvist, 
2004; Barber, Odean and Zheng, 2005). Our results also have implications for several important 
public policy issues. First, policymakers need to think carefully about how to select the fund 
options in a personal account component of the Social Security system. Second, it is important to 
create incentives for intermediaries, such as 401(k) plan providers and state 529 college-savings 
plan administrators, to pay attention to mutual fund fees, since many individual investors are not 
doing so themselves. Finally, policymakers should consider not only what information is 
disclosed, but also how it is disclosed. If important information such as a fund’s expense ratio 
and load were required to be made salient/transparent, rather than being buried in a long 
prospectus, we anticipate that there would be a significant aggregate reallocation of assets 
towards low-cost funds. This, in turn, would generate pressure for high-fee funds to lower their 
fees. Of course, such a measure would not have its desired effect if funds remain free to hide 
their fees in other ways, such as through soft-dollar agreements with their brokers.
4 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I describes the design of our primary experiment 
using S&P 500 index funds. Section II discusses the results from this experiment. Section III 
discusses the design and results from the experiment using actively managed funds. We conclude 
in Section IV. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
nks_0506.pdf for percentile rankings of combined SAT scores. 
4 In a soft-dollar agreement, a mutual fund will overpay its broker for trades in exchange for a kickback. We thank 
Gideon Saar for bringing this issue to our attention.   7
Section I. S&P 500 Index Fund Experiment Design 
  During the summer of 2005, we recruited MBA students at Wharton and college students 
at Harvard for the index fund experiment.
5 We paid the MBA students $20 and the college 
students $5 for participating in the experiment. In addition, we entered subjects into a lottery, 
described in greater detail below, for which there was one winner on each campus. All subjects 
could also receive an additional future payment contingent upon choices in an unrelated 
experiment run immediately after ours. (See Ericson (2005) for a description of this concurrent 
experiment.) We randomly assigned subjects to a control group or one of two treatment groups. 
  All subjects received a packet containing an investment choice sheet (reproduced in 
Appendix A) and photocopies of four S&P 500 index funds’ prospectuses.
6 Prospectuses are 
often the only document sent to potential investors requesting information about a fund.
 7 The 
choice sheet was one page long and had three sections. The first section explained the purpose of 
the experiment: to allocate $10,000 among the four S&P 500 index funds. It also told subjects 
that one participant would be selected at random to win any positive return his or her chosen 
allocation earned from September 1, 2005 through August 30, 2006. That is, if the value of the 
winning participant’s portfolio exceeded the $10,000 initial investment at the end of this period, 
the winner of the lottery would receive a payment equal to the value of the portfolio on August 
30, 2006 minus the initial investment of $10,000. If the value of the winning participant’s 
portfolio fell short of the initial $10,000 investment, the winner would receive nothing but would 
also not be responsible for the loss. The second section gave a numerical example of how this 
prize would be calculated. The third section contained a matrix in which participants entered 
their investment allocation. Participants were told they could allocate their investment across as 
many or as few funds as they desired, subject to two constraints: (1) they had to allocate exactly 
$10,000 in total, and (2) they had to satisfy the minimum opening balance requirement for any 
                                                 
5 The MBA students were mostly first-year students recruited during their pre-term orientation. Therefore, they had 
received very little MBA coursework at the time of the experiment. Nonetheless, our point stands that this highly 
selected group is very sophisticated relative to the typical individual investor. 
6 PDF copies of the prospectuses used in the experiment are available at 
http://www.som.yale.edu/faculty/jjc83/research.html. 
7 We had a research assistant pose as a potential investor and call a dozen companies’ customer service numbers to 
ask for material that would be useful for deciding whether to invest in the companies’ S&P 500 index funds. Our 
research assistant’s conversation with the Morgan Stanley representative was particularly amusing. He was told, 
“There are better S&P 500 index funds out there… There’s no question that Vanguard’s fund will outperform 
ours… Do not buy our S&P 500 index fund. It will not accomplish anything. I wouldn’t be able to look at myself in 
the mirror in the morning if I recommended that fund to you.”   8
fund to which they made an allocation. We imposed the latter restriction to mimic the constraints 
that an investor would face when making a real investment in these funds. The minimum 
opening balance for each fund was listed next to the column where participants were to write 
their selected allocation. 
  The first of the two treatment groups received a one-page “fee sheet” (reproduced in 
Appendix B) in addition to the choice sheet and prospectuses. The fee sheet explained that 
mutual funds charge fees, showed how to calculate the impact of loads and expense ratios on 
portfolio value, and listed the expense ratio, load, and dollar cost of the expense ratio and load 
for a one-year $10,000 investment in each of the four funds participants could select. All of the 
fee sheet information was contained in the prospectuses. If subject choices in the control 
condition reflect optimal utilization of all relevant information in the prospectuses, then this 
treatment should have no effect on portfolios. 
The second treatment group received the prospectuses, the choice sheet, and a one-page 
“returns sheet” (reproduced in Appendix C) listing the annualized returns since inception net of 
fees, expenses, and loads for each of the four funds. The funds’ inception dates were listed on the 
sheet, as well as the standard disclaimer, “Past performance is no guarantee of future results.” All 
funds in the experiment displayed the annualized returns since inception in the prospectus. 
Variation in annualized returns since inception across index funds should be ignored when 
predicting future relative returns, as such variation is driven almost entirely by the S&P 500’s 
performance over the fund’s lifetime. There is extensive evidence that mutual fund investors 
chase past returns (Hendricks, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1993), Ippolito (1992), Sirri and Tufano 
(1998), Chevalier and Ellison (1997)), but the rationality of such behavior is a subject of debate 
(Gruber (1996), Carhart (1997), Zheng (1999), Sapp and Tiwari (2004)). Our experiment 
provides new evidence on returns-chasing rationality by varying exposure to past returns 
information that should have no effect on fund allocation decisions.  
Subjects in all three groups were given as much or as little time as they wanted to make 
their investment allocations. They were not allowed to confer with each other while making their 
choices. When participants had completed their investment allocation, they returned all of the 
materials in their packet and were given a three-page debriefing survey to complete (reproduced 
in Appendix D). The survey asked for some demographic information. It also asked participants 
how important various factors were in their investment decision, how long they had looked at the   9
prospectuses, and how confident they were that the investment allocation they had chosen was 
optimal for them. Finally, it asked a series of questions designed to assess the participants’ 
financial literacy. These questions were modeled after those asked in the John Hancock Eighth 
Defined Contribution Plan Survey (John Hancock Financial Services (2002)). Thus, we are able 
to compare our subjects with John Hancock’s representative sample of individuals between the 
ages of 25 and 65 who contribute money to a retirement savings plan and have some choice of 
investment options in the plan. After returning the debriefing survey, the experiment ended. 
  We chose the four funds included in the experiment to satisfy the following criteria: (1) 
they sought to mimic the returns of the S&P 500 index, (2) they were front-end load funds with 
wide variation in the total fees charged, (3) they reported annualized returns since fund inception 
in their prospectus, (4) annualized returns since inception was positively correlated with fees, 
and (5) their prospectus was available as a PDF document online. 
  We focus on S&P 500 index funds because we can rank this universe normatively. 
Returns before fees are nearly identical across these funds, so the dominant driver of net return 
variation is the loads and expenses the funds charge. Because the winning experimental subject 
would not be making actual investments in the funds, non-portfolio considerations like the fund’s 
customer service, tax exposure, or the waiver of loads when purchasing the fund family’s other 
funds should be irrelevant.
8 
  We wanted wide variation in the fees charged by the funds we offered so that subjects’ 
decisions would meaningfully affect their expected returns. The largest source of S&P 500 index 
fund fee variation is their loads, which vary in the CRSP mutual fund database from 0% to 
5.75% of invested funds. There is also substantial variation in annual expense ratios, which vary 
from 6 to 200 basis points. We restricted the set of funds under consideration to those with loads 
because we did not want to confound sensitivity to total fees with sensitivity to the mere 
presence of a load.
9 We opted to include only front-end load funds because back-end loads are 
calculated as a percent of assets at the time of sale. Therefore, determining whether a given back-
                                                 
8 We did not explicitly state that the lottery winners’ payout would be based on the before-tax return of their 
portfolios. However, funds with higher returns since inception will tend to have a higher exposure to capital gains 
taxes. Since funds with high returns since inception tend to have higher fees in our experiment, subjects believing 
we would replicate the after-tax fund returns should still choose the lowest-fee fund, which also had the lowest 
annualized returns since inception. In the historical data, the high-fee Mason Street and Morgan Stanley funds had 
the highest capital gains distributions and the low-fee UBS and Allegiant funds had the lowest capital gains 
distributions. 
9 Barber, Odean, and Zheng (2005) argue that mutual fund investors are more sensitive to loads than expense ratios.   10
end load is more or less costly than a given front-end load requires an assumption about expected 
S&P 500 returns. 
  By requiring that our funds be less than 10 years old, we ensure that their prospectuses 
will report annualized returns since inception. Because we wanted to distinguish irrational 
returns-chasing behavior from rational fee-avoiding behavior, we searched for a fund menu 
where fees were positively correlated with annualized returns since inception. 
Finally, we restricted the set of S&P 500 index funds to those with a PDF prospectus 
available online. Although most mutual fund companies post their fund prospectuses on the 
Internet, many are in HTML format only. Printing these HTML files resulted in many formatting 
problems on the hard copies, such as page breaks in the middle of tables. We did not want the 
graphical polish of a prospectus to unduly influence subject choices. Furthermore, we did not 
want to reformat the HTML prospectuses because we wanted subjects to see the information 
provided by the mutual fund companies in the way that the companies had intended. 
After imposing the above criteria, the set of suitable S&P 500 index funds was 
remarkably small. The four funds we selected are the Allegiant S&P 500 Index Fund, the Mason 
Street Index 500 Stock Fund, the Morgan Stanley S&P 500 Index Fund, and the UBS S&P 500 
Index Fund. For all four funds, we specified that subjects could only invest in the Class A 
shares.
10 The funds, their ticker symbols, minimum opening balance requirements, fees, and 
annualized returns since inception net of fees, expenses, and loads are listed in Table 1. These 
numbers are all taken from the most recent prospectuses available at the time of the experiment, 
which list returns through December 31, 2003. 
The expense ratio across the four funds varied from 0.59% to 0.80%, and the load varied 
from 2.50% to 5.25%.
11 The total annual fee (expense ratio plus front-end load) on a $10,000 
investment held for one year varied from a low of $309 for the Allegiant fund to a high of $589 
for the Morgan Stanley fund.
12 Though the Allegiant fund is the lowest-cost fund, the total fee 
                                                 
10 Many mutual funds provide different classes of shares. Some share classes will charge a lower fee for investments 
that exceed a certain threshold, typically much higher than the $10,000 hypothetical investment that could be made 
in this experiment. Other share classes are differentiated by charging either a front-end or a back-end load. 
11 The expense ratio associated with each of these funds is not unambiguous because all four funds have in the past 
waived part of their stated expenses on an ad hoc basis each year. In this paper, we use the expense ratio from the 
prior year after any expense waivers, as stated in the prospectus, unless the fund guarantees the waiver level in the 
following year. This net-of-waiver expense ratio is what Morningstar reports and uses to rate funds. See 
Christoffersen (2001) for a discussion of mutual fund fee waivers. 
12 We calculate expenses on a $10,000 investment with the formula ($10,000 × (expense ratio + load)) for 
simplicity, since that was the total fee implicitly presented to subjects in the fees treatment condition. Calculating   11
for the UBS fund is only $11 more. The other two, the Mason Street and Morgan Stanley funds, 
have substantially higher loads and expense ratios. 
The annualized returns since inception across the four funds varied from a low of 1.3% 
for the Allegiant fund to a high of 5.9% for the Mason Street fund. Although all four funds were 
established during a 19-month window, the S&P 500 Index level ranged from 757 at the Mason 
Street fund’s inception to 1047 at the Allegiant fund’s inception. This variation in the S&P 500 
Index value at inception is largely responsible for the differences in the reported returns since 
inception. The four funds’ contemporaneous returns after expenses differ by no more than 35 
basis points in any year from 1999 to 2003 (the lowest-cost fund, Allegiant, always has the 
highest return), and the difference in loads—225 basis points at most—is amortized over at least 
five years of fund existence when calculating annualized returns since inception. Note that the 
fund with the highest annualized returns since inception (the Morgan Stanley fund) is one of the 
two high-cost funds, whereas the fund with the lowest reported returns since inception (the 
Allegiant fund) is the lowest-cost fund. 
 
Section II. S&P 500 Index Fund Experiment Results 
A. Subject Characteristics 
  As noted earlier, the majority of the participants in the index fund experiment were either 
Wharton MBA students or college students recruited on the Harvard campus. Although we 
aimed to recruit only MBA subjects on the Wharton campus, we did not explicitly prohibit non-
MBA students from participating in the experiment, and our Wharton campus subject pool 
included 15 college students and two economics Ph.D. students.
13 We conduct our analyses for 
both the full sample of participants across the two campuses and for two separate subgroups. 
Because we believe the differences between undergraduate and graduate students are more 
significant than the differences between the undergraduate student populations across the two 
university campuses, we group the 248 MBA subjects with the two economics Ph.D. students 
and refer to them collectively as the “MBA sample.” We group the 15 college students on the 
Wharton campus with the 72 subjects at the Harvard campus and refer to them collectively as the 
“college sample.”  
                                                                                                                                                             
expenses using the formula ($10,000 × load) + ($10,000 × (1 – load) × expense ratio) yields almost identical results 
for all of the analytics in the paper.   12
  Table 2 gives summary statistics on our subject pool. The majority of both the college 
and MBA samples is male, although the gender imbalance is greater among the MBAs. The 
“college” sample includes a few high school students who were taking summer school classes on 
campus, as well as a few college graduates. Both MBAs and college subjects report 
extraordinarily high average SAT scores (the 98th and 99th percentiles, respectively). They are 
also more financially literate than the typical American investor sampled in the widely cited John 
Hancock Defined Contribution Plan Survey (John Hancock Financial Services (2002)). Only 8% 
of John Hancock respondents knew what kinds of assets a money market fund holds, versus 15% 
of our college subjects and 40% of our MBA subjects.
14 John Hancock respondents on average 
thought that the stock of their own company was less risky than an equity mutual fund (on a 5-
point scale, the average risk rating was 3.1 for employer stock and 3.6 for an equity mutual 
fund), but all six of our subsamples (one control and two treatment groups for the MBA and 
college samples) on average rated a typical Fortune 500 stock as more risky than an equity 
mutual fund. (This second comparison is potentially confounded by the fact that John Hancock 
respondents were asked about their own employer, whereas our subjects were asked about a 
random large company.) Through the luck of the draw, control group MBAs are less financially 
knowledgeable than other MBAs when judged by their knowledge of money market fund’s 
investments are. We will show in Section II.C that our treatment estimates are robust to 
controlling for this difference. 
MBAs reported spending 11 to 14 minutes on average reading the prospectuses.
15 These 
figures are close to those calculated from our own records of how much time elapsed between a 
subject’s receiving the experimental materials and his or her returning them (this does not 
include time filling out the debriefing form). College subjects reported spending 8 to 11 minutes 
on average reading the prospectuses. Unfortunately, we did not keep our own records of how 
much time Harvard subjects took, so we cannot independently corroborate their reports. Subjects 
in both control groups report spending more time reading the prospectuses than the treatment 
groups, which is sensible given that they received only the prospectuses and neither summary 
sheet. As a whole, these numbers alleviate concerns that subjects simply randomized without 
                                                                                                                                                             
13 We confirmed the Wharton student affiliations by checking their school-issued identification cards. 
14 The correct answer is short-term U.S. government bonds. 
15 When a subject reported a range of time, such as “10 to 15 minutes,” we assigned the midpoint of that range to the 
subject.   13
exerting any mental effort when making their allocations. The average time spent reading the 
prospectuses should be enough for a knowledgeable subject to find the expenses in the four 
documents. Since participants could leave the experiment at any time they wished, time spent in 
the experiment likely reflects time actually spent in the decision-making process. Additional 
evidence against the randomization hypothesis comes from Wald tests, which can reject equality 
of subjects’ mean allocations to each fund at the 1% level for all six experimental subgroups. 
 
B. Main Portfolio Results 
  Table 3 shows the mean portfolio fee (load plus expense ratio) paid in each condition by 
subject type, as well as the average (weighted by dollar allocation) annualized returns since 
inception of the funds in the portfolios. For the pooled sample, the average fee paid in the control 
condition is $424.
16 This is only slightly below the $443 fee subjects would have paid if they had 
chosen randomly and much higher than the $309 fee they would have paid if they had allocated 
all $10,000 to the lowest cost Allegiant fund. Contrary to our expectations, MBAs do no better 
than college students when simply provided with the mutual fund prospectuses. MBAs in the 
control condition paid $421 in fees on average, which is only $10 less than the average college 
control fee, and we cannot reject the hypothesis that the means are equal (one-sided p = 0.26). 
The first two series in Figure 1 show the average control group allocations across the four funds. 
Both the MBAs and college students allocated 19% of their money to the lowest cost fund, and 
about 60% of their money to the two low-cost funds combined. The remaining 40% is allocated 
to the two high-cost funds. 
  The second row of Table 3 shows that providing the fee summary sheet lowers the 
average fee paid by $55 for MBAs and $21 for college students. This drop is significant at the 
1% level for the MBAs, but the one-sided p-value is only 0.15 for the college sample, both 
because of the smaller sample size and the smaller magnitude of the effect.
17 The fee sheet effect 
is significant at the 1% level when the two samples are pooled together. It seems that the MBAs’ 
                                                 
16 Approximately one-third of the MBAs and one-sixth of the college sample reports not having taken the SAT. 
Many of these subjects may be foreign students, which raises the concern that poor English skills or unfamiliarity 
with U.S. financial institutions may cause them to pay high fees. However, we find no significant difference in mean 
portfolio fees paid by subjects who did and did not take the SAT (one-sided p-value of 0.27, not reported in a table). 
17 In case subjects misunderstood the experiment’s reward scheme and believed that we would not deduct the funds’ 
sales loads from their portfolios, we also compared the average expense ratios between the control and fees 
treatment groups and found the mean to be significantly lower in the pooled fees treatment group than the pooled 
controls.   14
sophistication manifests itself in their greater responsiveness to useful information. Nonetheless, 
even MBAs usually do not use the information optimally. The last two series in Figure 1 show a 
shift to the lowest-cost fund for the fees treatment groups relative to the control groups. 
Nonetheless, the MBAs in the fees treatment group still allocate 20% of their assets to the two 
high-cost funds, whereas the fees treatment college students allocate 37% to the two high-cost 
funds. 
  Figure 2, which graphs the MBA and college student fee distributions in the control and 
fees treatment conditions, shows that only 19% of MBA subjects and 10% of college subjects 
under the fees treatment allocate all of their money to the lowest-cost fund, thus paying the 
minimum $309 in fees. While these proportions are higher than the 6% of MBA controls and 0% 
of college controls who allocated all their money to the cheapest fund, they are far from the 
100% one would expect under optimal choice. This result suggests that search costs alone cannot 
explain the tendency to invest in high-fee index funds, since the fee sheet brings these search 
costs close to zero. Instead, subjects seem to either misunderstand what they are getting in 
exchange for higher fees,
18 or they value normatively irrelevant characteristics. 
  The third row of Table 3 shows portfolio statistics for subjects who received the summary 
sheet containing returns since inception for the four funds. The returns sheet causes MBAs to 
shift their portfolios towards funds with higher returns since inception; the average returns since 
inception rise from 3.06% in the control group to 3.53%, a difference that is significant at the 1% 
level. The college sample responds even more strongly to the irrelevant information in the 
returns sheet; average returns since inception for this group increase from 2.86% to 4.03%, a 
change that is also significant at the 1% level. Because we had constructed the fund menu so that 
fees would be positively correlated with returns since inception, subjects reduce their future 
returns by chasing past returns. The MBA returns sheet group paid an additional $19 in average 
fees than the MBA control group, while the college returns sheet group paid $55 more than the 
college control group. Figure 3 compares the average allocation to each fund in the returns sheet 
condition to that in the control condition. The fraction invested in the Mason Street fund, which 
has the highest annualized returns since inception, rises from 23% to 35% among the MBAs and 
from 17% to 48% among the college subjects. The proportion of subjects allocating all their 
money to Mason Street rose from 5% to 14% among the MBAs and from 0% to 11% among the 
                                                 
18 This could include a misperception about the extent of active management in an index fund.   15
college subjects (not graphed). Again, the sophistication of the MBAs manifests itself in their 
response to additional information; in this case, MBAs responded less to the irrelevant returns 
information than college subjects. 
 
B. Interpreting the Portfolio Results 
  In order to gain insight into what motivated subjects’ decisions in the three experimental 
conditions, we asked them on the debriefing survey (Appendix D) to rate how important eleven 
factors were in shaping their final portfolio. We assign the integers 1 through 5 to the five 
possible ratings, with 1 corresponding to “not very important at all” and 5 corresponding to “very 
important.” Table 4 reports the average integer rating of each factor’s importance with the 
associated ordinal ranking in parentheses (lower numbers indicate a higher rank). 
The college control group ranked fund performance over the past year and fund 
performance since inception as the first- and second-most important factors respectively. Factors 
other than the first-ranked past-year performance must have played a significant role, since 
choosing the fund with the highest performance over the past year would have led subjects to 
invest exclusively in the lowest-cost fund, Allegiant. The desire to diversify among funds is 
ranked as the third-most important factor. Given that the four funds hold approximately the same 
portfolio of stocks, this suggests that subjects may be misapplying a diversification heuristic 
(Benartzi and Thaler (2001)). Consistent with their reported diversification motive, 53% of the 
college control group allocated some money to all four funds. Of the eleven factors, fund fees, 
expenses, and loads were ranked eighth, just ahead of the fund’s customer service (which is 
irrelevant for a hypothetical investment) and behind brand recognition. Given this ranking, it 
seems unlikely that college subjects’ search efforts were directed towards finding the most 
relevant information about the funds—their cost—contrary to the assumptions of a classical 
rational search model. 
In contrast, MBA control subjects rank fees as the most important factor in their portfolio 
decision. As noted above, however, their fees are no lower on average than the college control 
subjects’ fees. The small gain that the MBA controls reap from their prioritization of fees 
indicates that the cost of accurately finding fees in the prospectuses is quite high for most MBAs 
and/or that the false allure of past returns—ranked second and third by the MBA controls—and 
other factors is strong enough to offset the benefits from prioritizing fees.   16
Providing the summary sheets elevated the importance ranking of the information 
provided on the summary sheet. In the fees treatment condition, college subjects rank fees as 
their most important factor (versus eighth for the control group); in the returns condition, they 
rank returns since inception as their most important factor (versus second for the control group). 
MBAs in both the control and fees treatment conditions rank fees as their most important factor. 
However, MBAs in the fees condition assign a higher absolute score to fees than MBAs in the 
control condition. In the returns condition, MBAs rank the two past performance factors first and 
second, while fees rank third (versus first for the control group). 
  These factor rankings appear to contain real information: subjects who rank fees highly 
do in fact choose portfolios with lower fees, and those who rank returns highly choose portfolios 
with higher past returns (and higher fees). Table 5 presents results from a set of univariate 
regressions of fees and returns since inception on the integer ranking of the eleven factors (each 
cell has coefficient estimates from a separate regression). The results must be interpreted with 
caution because it is not clear that the rating units are comparable across individuals, nor that the 
distance between adjacent categories is always equal. Nonetheless, the regressions indicate that 
under this coding, those who rated fees as a more important driver of their decision paid 
significantly less in fees (the first, third and fifth columns in Table 5), whereas those who rated 
returns since inception as more important chose portfolios with significantly higher returns since 
inception (the second, fourth and sixth columns in Table 5).  
There are two plausible channels through which the summary sheets could affect 
portfolio choices. The first is by lowering search costs, thus increasing the precision with which 
subjects observed fees or returns since inception. In order for this channel to be operative, 
subjects must have imperfectly observed fees and returns since inception in the control condition. 
The second is through an inference by subjects that our distributing the summary sheets implied 
that the information in them was useful for making a normatively correct choice. Subjects must 
have had some uncertainty about how to make the correct investment choice for this channel to 
have an effect. 
The simplest story that can explain all the experimental results is one in which only the 
search cost channel is operative. Suppose that subjects value both low fees and high past returns 
when choosing mutual funds, but they imperfectly observe both. MBAs put more weight on low 
fees than college subjects do, but the combination of imperfect observation and the greater   17
weight college subjects put on past one-year returns (which leads one to the lowest fee fund for 
the wrong reason) means that MBAs and college subjects pay the same average fees in the 
control condition. The more one values an attribute, the greater one’s choices shift when 
information precision about that attribute increases. Therefore, MBAs respond more to the fees 
summary sheet, and college subjects respond more to the returns summary sheet. 
Implicit advice effects could augment the search cost effect. But if one chooses to 
interpret the treatment effects as arising entirely through the implicit advice channel, one needs 
to explain why the inference made by MBAs is stronger than the inference made by college 
subjects under the fees treatment but weaker under the returns treatment. This seems to require a 
more complicated story, which makes this interpretation less appealing. An example of such 
story is one in which those more knowledgeable make smaller inferences from implicit advice in 
general because they are surer of their decisions. This explains why MBAs respond less to the 
returns summary sheet than college subjects. However, when useful implicit advice is offered, 
this jogs the memory of the knowledgeable (“I had forgotten that fees are important, but this 
reminds me!”), generating larger movements in choices. In the ignorant, there is no such memory 
to rekindle. 
 
C. Portfolio Choices and Subject Characteristics 
  In this section, we examine how subject characteristics affected their portfolio choices. 
We first consider the impact of basic demographic characteristics. Table 6 regresses portfolio 
fees and returns since inception on gender, years of education, and SAT scores, as well as a set 
of treatment dummies, a college sample dummy, and interactions of the treatment dummies with 
the college sample dummy. Note that adding SAT scores to the regression reduces our sample by 
more than half due to non-response. We find no significant demographic effects on fees paid 
after controlling for MBA status and treatment group effects. These weak demographic effects 
may be due to sample selectivity. The students in our sample have been selected to have a very 
narrow (and high) range of ability by admissions offices using more data than we have. A sample 
that was randomly selected from the U.S. population is likely to have more variation in ability 
that is predictable by demographics. 
  In addition to the basic demographic characteristics discussed above, the debriefing 
survey completed by respondents also included questions designed to gauge financial knowledge   18
and investment confidence. The first and fourth columns of Table 7 show the distribution of 
responses to the questions about the likelihood of changing one’s decision in response to 
professional advice, confidence that one’s decision was optimal, self-assessed investment 
knowledge, and the types of investments found in a money market fund. Note that the MBAs 
score more highly on investment confidence and both the objective and self-assessed measures 
of financial knowledge. 
  Table 8 uses either probit or ordered probit regressions to examine the relationship 
between greater knowledge or confidence and the demographic, treatment, and sample controls 
used in Table 6. Across the measures of self-assessed knowledge and confidence, college 
subjects and females were often significantly less confident.
19 No other variable shows a 
significant effect in more than one specification. When investment knowledge is objectively 
measured through the money markets question, the only significant effect is a negative 
coefficient on the female dummy, but this occurs only in the subsample that reports SAT scores. 
In Table 6, we saw that although college subjects and women pay higher fees on average, this 
difference is not statistically significant. 
  Although there is no relationship between demographic characteristics and portfolio fees, 
there is a relationship between the financial knowledge and investor confidence measures and 
fees. The second and fourth columns of Table 7 report, for each response to these questions, the 
average portfolio fee paid. Strikingly, the fees are generally decreasing in self-assessed 
confidence or knowledge as well as in objectively measured knowledge. For example, in the 
MBA sample, the average fee decreases monotonically from $439 to $356 with the level of 
confidence elicited by the question, “How confident are you that the decision you made is the 
right one for you?” The subjects who pay the highest fees themselves doubt that they are truly 
making the best portfolio allocation. There are two instances of non-monotonicity. The first is 
among college subjects when reporting their confidence in the optimality of their decision: those 
who report being “very confident” pay more than those who report being “relatively confident.” 
However, there are only four “very confident” college subjects, so the non-monotonicity here is 
likely due to noise. The second instance is among the 15 MBAs who consider themselves to be 
                                                 
19 See Niederle and Vesterlund (2005) for experimental evidence documenting greater overconfidence in men than 
women.   19
“very knowledgeable” investors. These MBAs pay a higher average fee than all other MBAs 
except for the 15 least confident. 
  Table 8 had documented a correlation between demographic characteristics and the 
answers to these knowledge and confidence questions. To see if demographic characteristics can 
account for the relationship between fees paid and knowledge/confidence, Table 9 regresses 
portfolio fees on both demographics and knowledge/confidence. The knowledge and confidence 
measures are coded with integers that increase in knowledge/confidence.
 20 Even after controlling 
for demographics, treatment, and sample effects, higher knowledge and confidence measures are 
generally associated with lower fees. The effects, however, are only statistically significant in the 
larger sample that includes non-respondents to the SAT question. We also see that the fees 
treatment effect remains statistically significant and comparable in magnitude to the estimates in 
Table 6 after controlling for differences in financial knowledge and investment confidence. 
  A final metric collected in the debriefing survey was time spent looking at the 
prospectuses. As reported in Table 2, subjects spent 8 to 14 minutes on average looking at the 
prospectus. Table 10 presents the results of regressing time spent looking at the prospectuses on 
demographics, the financial knowledge and investment confidence measures, and treatment 
group and sample dummies. College subjects spent 4 to 5 fewer minutes looking at the 
prospectuses than the MBAs. Among the MBAs, those in both treatment groups spent 2 to 4 
fewer minutes looking at the prospectuses than did the MBA controls. In most specifications, the 
treatment effects on time spent is greater in magnitude among college subjects, but the difference 
is not statistically significant. College students spent 2 fewer minutes reading the prospectuses 
for every year they had been in school.
21 There is no significant effect of SAT scores, investment 
knowledge, or likelihood of changing one’s portfolio upon receiving advice, but subjects who 
were more confident about the optimality of their decision spent more time reading the 
prospectuses. The causality of this last effect is, of course, quite likely to run in the other 
direction. 
  Table 11 shows that each minute spent reading the prospectus reduced portfolio fees by a 
little more than 2 basis points. However, the interaction of the fees treatment dummy with time 
                                                 
20 The self-reported variables are coded from responses to multiple-choice questions that had three or five possible 
answers. Each possible answer was assigned an integer from 1 to 3 or 1 to 5, with higher numbers corresponding to 
greater knowledge, greater confidence, and less likelihood of making a change in an advisor had been consulted. 
21 Almost all of the variation in the years of education variable comes from college subjects.   20
spent reading the prospectuses indicates that in the fees treatment, spending more time reading 
the prospectus yielded no reduction in fees. In fact, the point estimates indicate that time spent 
reading the prospectus slightly increases fees paid. This makes sense, since all the information 
needed to minimize fees was contained in the fee sheet. Reading the prospectus was likely to 
confuse the subject and lead him or her astray. For example, reading the prospectus might cause 
subjects to place greater weight on the irrelevant variation in returns since inception. An 
alternative interpretation is that fees treatment subjects who were initially more skeptical about 
the sufficiency of fees alone for making the optimal investment choice were likely to spend more 
time reading the prospectus. 
 
Section III. Small Cap Value Fund Experiment 
  Because most mutual funds are actively managed, we ran a similar experiment in Spring 
2004 using four actively-managed small cap value funds in the investment menu.
22 The subjects 
in this experiment were 36 law, MBA, and undergraduate students enrolled in a class at the 
University of Pennsylvania. Table 12 describes the four mutual funds in this experiment: the 
American Express Small Cap Value Fund, the Columbia Small Cap Value Fund, the Morgan 
Stanley Small-Mid Special Value Fund, and the Scudder Small Company Value Fund. All four 
funds charged front-end loads for their Class A shares, which were the share classes made 
available to subjects. Total fees for a one-year $10,000 investment ranged from $664 for the 
Morgan Stanley fund to $746 for the Scudder fund. We did not attempt to create a positive 
correlation between past returns and fees in this experiment. In fact, the correlation between past 
one-year returns and fees is –0.73, so returns-chasing will tend to lower portfolio fees. 
  As in the index fund experiment, no formal time constraints were placed on the subjects, 
and one subject was randomly chosen to receive any profit his or her portfolio realized in the 
ensuing year.
23 In contrast to the index fund experiment, this experiment had no returns treatment 
condition. 
Even though the normative ranking of funds in the active-management universe is not as 
clear as in the passive-management universe, it appears that making fee information salient has a 
                                                 
22 Chronologically, this experiment was run before the index fund experiment. 
23 For this experiment, the year-long time period for the calculation of the “prize” has expired. The winner selected a 
portfolio which declined in value over the year. The subject was reminded of his/her participation in the experiment   21
similar effect on investor choices in both realms. This suggests that subjects in the control 
condition are not optimally using fee information to make their choices. Table 13 shows the 
mean portfolio fee (load plus expense ratio) paid by subjects in the control and fees treatment 
conditions. In the control condition, the average fee is $720. This is exactly equal to the fee 
subjects would have paid if they had randomly chosen portfolios and is much higher than the 
$664 fee they would have paid if they had allocated all $10,000 to the lowest cost fund, Morgan 
Stanley. Those in the fees treatment group chose portfolios with lower fees—$705—but this is 
still much higher than the minimum possible fee. The difference relative to the control group, 
$15, is significant at the 5% level in a one-sided test. Given possible differences in expected 
returns across these actively managed funds, it is more difficult to say whether paying these 
higher fees in the treatment condition was rational. 
  Figure 4 shows the mean portfolio share invested in each fund for the control and fees 
treatment groups. In the control group, the lowest cost fund—Morgan Stanley—accounts for 
25.0% of total assets, whereas the highest cost fund—Scudder—accounts for 24.2% of total 
assets. Relative to the control group, participants in the fees treatment group allocated 18.9 
percentage points more to the lowest-cost fund and 9.2 percentage points less to the highest-cost 
fund. Figure 5 shows the distribution of total fees (load plus expense ratio) in the control and fees 
treatment group portfolios. As expected given the results in Figure 4, the fee distribution shifts to 
the left for the fees treatment group. Table 14 shows that both groups reported in their debriefing 
forms that past fund performance over a longer horizon than one year was the most important 
factor in their portfolio choice. However, treatment subjects ranked expense ratios as the third 
most important factor in their decision, whereas control subjects ranked expense ratios a distant 
eighth. No other questions were asked on the debriefing form of this experiment. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
When consumers in a commodity market observe prices and quality with noise, a high 
degree of competition will not drive markups to zero (Gabaix, Laibson, and Li, 2005). In this 
paper, we present two experiments that suggest that potential investors—including Wharton 
MBA students —exhibit such confusion about the mutual fund market. 
                                                                                                                                                             
following this period and informed that his/her portfolio had declined in value over the year, resulting in no prize 
payout.   22
Our experiments exogenously manipulate the transparency of mutual fund fees and the 
salience of past returns without changing the total body of information available to investors. In 
our control condition, subjects review four S&P 500 index fund prospectuses and allocate 
$10,000 across those funds. Subjects are randomly selected to be paid for their subsequent 
portfolio performance. Because payments are made by the experimenters, investment company 
services like financial advice are unbundled from portfolio returns. Despite this unbundling, 
subjects overwhelmingly fail to minimize index fund fees. These results imply that many 
investors do not understand the importance of mutual fund fees. Even subjects who claim to 
understand the importance of fees nevertheless show minimal sensitivity to the fee information 
in the prospectus. 
In a treatment condition, we make fee information transparent. This reduces allocations to 
high-cost funds, but investors still overwhelmingly do not minimize index fund fees. Subjects 
apparently base their choices on other normatively irrelevant mutual fund attributes. For 
example, making index-fund returns since inception salient leads investors to chase these 
statistics (cf. Choi et al., 2004). However, our survey evidence reveals that investors in high-cost 
index funds do sense that they may be making a mistake.  
Our subjects demonstrate a low absolute level of financial sophistication, including those 
who are enrolled in an elite MBA program. However, our subjects are significantly more 
sophisticated than the typical American household that is contributing to a retirement account. 
This does not inspire optimism about the financial choices made by most US households. It is 
likely that some “serious” investors—particularly high net worth investors—have managed to 
overtake the literacy of Wharton MBA students. Hence, the asset markets may be “sophisticated” 
on a dollar-weighted basis. But welfare calculations are usually weighted by person, not by net 
worth. 
Policymakers commonly regulate the form of price disclosure. For example, most U.S. 
states have unit pricing laws that require grocery stores to show customers the price-per-unit-
weight or the price-per-unit-volume to facilitate comparisons across products. In a similar vein, 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulates mutual fund prospectuses to facilitate 
comparisons across funds. Our results indicate, however, that current regulations may not obtain 
their intended result. First, mutual fund investors may not see the fees, which are now published 
inside a long prospectus. Second, even investors that do see the fees may not know how to use   23
them in forming their portfolios. Our experiment studies a pure commodity case where investors 
underweight the fee, even when it is made transparent and thrust into the spotlight. 
Finally, our results suggest a conceptual path out of the revealed preference tautology. 
Standard economic methodology rules out optimization errors by assuming that any observed 
action must maximize utility. We show that subjects who pay higher fees tend to be less sure that 
they are maximizing their own utility. Developing reliable ways of eliciting agents’ confidence 
in their own actions may prove to be a fruitful way of identifying the areas in which optimization 
errors play an economically important role. Students in math classes seem to know when they 
probably got an answer wrong on an exam. Our evidence suggests that economic agents also 
know when they probably made an error in a utility maximization problem. Unfortunately, 
knowing that your choice is wrong does not necessarily tell you how to fix it.  24
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 TABLE 5. Index Fund Experiment:  
Effect of Factor Importance Ranking on Portfolio Fees and Returns Since Inception 
  MBA sample  College sample  Pooled sample 
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Sample size  N = 250  N = 250  N = 87  N = 87  N = 336  N = 336 
Source: Authors’ calculations. Each cell reports the coefficient from a univariate regression of participants’ 
portfolios fees or annualized returns since inception on participants’ rating of each factor’s importance in shaping 
their investment decision. The explanatory variables are integers from 1 to 5, where 1 corresponds to the response 
“not at all important” and 5 to the response “very important.” Some regressions are calculated using fewer 
observations than reported in the last row because of subject non-response to the relevant question. Standard errors 
are in parentheses. * denotes significance at the 5% level. ** denotes significance at the 1% level. TABLE 6. Index Fund Experiment:  
Demographic Correlates of Portfolio Fees and Returns Since Inception 
  Portfolio fees  Returns since inception 
-0.544** -0.591**  -0.754**  -1.062**  Fees treatment 
(0.122) (0.200)  (0.158)  (0.247) 
0.339 0.245  0.485  0.608  Fees treatment × College 
(0.239) (0.340)  (0.309)  (0.418) 
0.200 0.255  0.494**  0.422  Returns treatment 
(0.122) (0.197)  (0.158)  (0.243) 
0.364 0.423  0.670* 1.012*  Returns treatment × College 
(0.243) (0.343)  (0.313)  (0.422) 
0.147 0.175  -0.356 -0.380  College 
(0.192) (0.273)  (0.248)  (0.336) 
0.133 0.154  0.159  0.134  Female 
(0.090) (0.140)  (0.116)  (0.172) 
0.039 -0.045  -0.087  -0.200  Years of education 
(0.061) (0.083)  (0.079)  (0.102) 
 -0.000    0.000  SAT score 
 (0.001)   (0.001) 
3.499** 4.849**  4.473**  6.064**  Constant 
(1.039) (1.846)  (1.342)  (2.273) 
        
Sample size  N = 336  N = 150  N = 336  N = 150 
Source: Authors’ calculations. This table reports regressions of portfolio fees and average returns since fund 
inception. Fees treatment, College, Returns treatment, and Female are dummies for being in a fees treatment 
group, the college sample, a returns treatment group, and being female, respectively. Years of education is taken 
from subject debriefing forms. SAT score is the combined SAT math and verbal score reported by subjects. 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































TABLE 10. Index Fund Experiment:  
Determinants of Minutes Spent Looking at Prospectuses 
-2.478* -4.458* -2.477* -2.399* -2.626* -2.537*  Fees treatment 
(1.031) (1.786) (1.033) (1.024) (1.026) (1.032) 
-0.989  1.453 -0.992 -0.978 -0.546 -1.096  Fees treatment × 
College  (2.102) (3.111) (2.106) (2.103) (2.099) (2.104) 
-2.826** -3.202  -2.824** -3.096** -2.810** -2.807**  Returns treatment 
(1.032) (1.743) (1.034) (1.030) (1.025) (1.032) 
-0.984  0.467 -0.984 -0.694 -0.716 -1.038  Returns treatment × 
College  (2.046) (2.988) (2.050) (2.053) (2.037) (2.046) 
-4.438** -5.476*  -4.417** -4.654** -4.219** -4.222**  College 
(1.595) (2.365) (1.632) (1.613) (1.587) (1.606) 
-0.485 -0.068 -0.472 -0.857 -0.159 -0.278  Female 
(0.762) (1.241) (0.791) (0.764) (0.771) (0.785) 
-1.515** -1.946** -1.515** -1.553** -1.514** -1.546**  Years of education 
(0.528) (0.730) (0.529) (0.521) (0.524) (0.528) 
 0.009        SAT score 
  (0.007)      
   0.024      Investment knowledge 
   (0.384)     
    -0.384     Know money markets 
    (0.794)    
     0.820*    Confidence in decision 
     (0.370)   
      -0.632  Less likely to change 
      (0.579) 
39.448** 32.977*  39.373** 40.414** 36.500** 41.216**  Constant 
(8.956)  (16.376) (9.053) (8.844) (8.997) (9.098) 
        
Sample size  N = 312  N = 135  N = 306  N = 306  N = 312  N = 312 
Source: Authors’ calculations. This table reports regressions of the number of minutes subjects reported they spent 
looking at the prospectuses. Fees treatment, College, Returns treatment, and Female are dummies for being in a 
fees treatment group, the college sample, a returns treatment group, and being female, respectively. Years of 
education is taken from subject debriefing forms. SAT score is the combined SAT math and verbal score reported 
by subjects. The four knowledge and confidence variables take integer values that increase with knowledge or 
confidence. Investment knowledge codes self-assessed investment knowledge. Know money markets is a dummy 
for whether the subject knew what assets a money market fund holds. Confidence in decision codes self-assessed 
confidence that the investment decision was right for the subject. Less likely to change codes self-assessed 
likelihood the subject would change his or her portfolio in response to professional advice. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. * denotes significance at the 5% level. ** denotes significance at the 1% level. 
  
TABLE 11. Index Fund Experiment: Effect of Minutes Spent Looking at Prospectuses  
on Portfolio Fees and Returns Since Inception 
  Portfolio fees  Returns since inception 
-0.892** -0.905** -1.036** -0.874** -0.855*  -1.401**  Fees treatment 
(0.249) (0.250) (0.334) (0.332) (0.332) (0.434) 
0.025 0.026 0.042 0.010 0.009 0.032  Fees treatment × Time 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.033) 
0.268 0.270 0.083 0.473 0.384 0.521  Fees treatment × 
College  (0.257) (0.260) (0.354) (0.342) (0.346) (0.460) 
0.065 0.077 0.496 0.702*  0.729*  0.945*  Returns treatment 
(0.229) (0.231) (0.334) (0.306) (0.307) (0.434) 
0.006 0.006  -0.028  -0.019  -0.021  -0.052  Returns treatment × 
Time  (0.016) (0.016) (0.024) (0.021) (0.021) (0.031) 
0.339 0.327 0.357 0.584 0.494 0.824  Returns treatment × 
College  (0.248) (0.253) (0.342) (0.330) (0.336) (0.444) 
0.073 0.075 0.068  -0.224  -0.432  -0.622  College 
(0.174) (0.197) (0.275) (0.232) (0.262) (0.357) 
-0.023* -0.023* -0.024  -0.005  -0.007  -0.022  Time spent 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.018) 
 0.108  0.187   0.131  0.118  Female 
 (0.093)  (0.142)   (0.124)  (0.184) 
 0.011  -0.097    -0.138  -0.303**  Years of education 
 (0.065)  (0.086)   (0.087)  (0.112) 
   -0.000     0.001  SAT score 
   (0.001)     (0.001) 
4.508** 4.290** 6.092** 3.127** 5.442** 7.630**  Constant 
(0.175) (1.127) (1.909) (0.234) (1.498) (2.479) 
        
Sample size  N = 313  N = 312  N = 135  N = 313  N = 312  N = 135 
Source: Authors’ calculations. This table reports regressions of portfolio fees and average returns since fund 
inception. Time is the number of minutes the subject reported he or she spent looking at the prospectuses. Fees 
treatment, College, Returns treatment, and Female are dummies for being in a fees treatment group, the college 
sample, a returns treatment group, and being female, respectively. Years of education is taken from subject 
debriefing forms. SAT score is the combined SAT math and verbal score reported by subjects. Standard errors are 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 TABLE 13. Small Cap Value Fund Experiment: Average Portfolio Fees 
Control (N = 18)  $720 
Fees treatment (N = 18)  $705 
  
t test of equality of means  
(one-sided p-values, unequal variances) 
   Control = fees treatment  0.0284 
Source: Authors’ calculations. This table reports the average fee on a $10,000 investment 
paid by the control and fees treatment groups. In addition, it presents a test of the null 
hypothesis that the mean fee paid by both groups is equal. 
  
TABLE 14.  Small Cap Value Fund Experiment: 
Ranking of Factors Shaping Investment Decisions 
  Control Fees  treatment 
Quality of prospectus  2.17 (7)  2.94 (8) 
Brand recognition      2.78 (4)  3.31 (4) 
Past experience with fund companies  1.61 (11)  2.75 (9) 
Expense ratios  2.00 (8)  3.44 (2) 
Minimum opening balance requirements  1.83 (10)  2.44 (10) 
Investment objectives  2.83 (3)  3.31 (4) 
Asset mix of the funds  2.94 (2)  3.13 (6) 
Fund performance over the past year  2.78 (4)  3.44 (2) 
Fund performance over a longer horizon  3.28 (1)  3.88 (1) 
Customer service of fund  1.89 (9)  2.25 (11) 
Desire to diversify across funds  2.67 (6)  3.06 (7) 
Sample size  N=18
  N=18 
Source: Each cell reports the average importance the factor had on the relevant subsample’s investment decision, 
as elicited in the debriefing surveys. There were five possible responses, from “not important at all” to “very 
important.” We assigned integers 1 through 5 to each possible response. Each factor’s ordinal rank for the relevant 
subsample is in parentheses, with lower integers corresponding to greater importance. Some factors’ ratings are 
calculated based on slightly fewer observations due to non-response.   
 Figure 1. Index Fund Experiment: Mean Portfolio Shares in 
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Figure 2. Index Fund Experiment: Distribution of Fees Paid in 
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 Figure 3. Index Fund Experiment: Mean Portfolio Shares in 
















































































































 Figure 5. Small Cap Value Fund Experiment: 







$664 $664-$685 $685-$705 $705-$725 $725-$746























Please allocate $10,000 among the S&P 500 index funds listed below.  You 
may choose to allocate all $10,000 to one fund or allocate your investment 
across as many funds as you like.  One participant will be randomly selected to 
earn a cash prize equal to the increase in value of their portfolio from 
September 1, 2005 to August 31, 2006.  If you are the winner, you will be 
contacted via email. If your portfolio is worth less than $10,000 at the end of 
the period, you will not be responsible for these losses. This is a risk-free 
opportunity to win a potentially large reward.   
 
 
PRIZE CALCULATION EXAMPLES 
Example #1: 
Suppose your hypothetical account balance is $11,000 on August 31, 2006 and you were selected as 
the winner.  Then you would win a $1,000 prize, the difference between your original investment and 
your final account balance. 
 
Example #2: 
Suppose your hypothetical account balance is $8,500 on August 31, 2006 and you were selected as 




Below is the menu of S&P 500 index funds from which you may choose.   
•  Write the dollar amount you would like to allocate to each fund 
•  You may invest in as many or as few funds as you choose 
•  Please be careful to allocate a total of exactly $10,000 
•  If you put money in a fund, that amount must satisfy the minimum 
opening allocation requirement 
Any portfolio allocations which violate minimum opening allocation 
requirements or which fail to total $10,000 will be ineligible for the prize. 
 
Mutual Fund  Symbol  Minimum Opening Allocation 
if Buying Shares in Fund 
Allocation in Dollars 
(column must sum to $10,000)
           
Allegiant S&P 500 Index 
Fund - Class A  AEXAX  $500    
Mason Street Index 500 
Stock Fund - Class A  MISAX  $1,000   
Morgan Stanley S&P 
500 Index Fund - Class 
A 
SPIAX  $1,000    
UBS S&P 500 Index 
Fund - Class A  PSPIX  $1,000    
 
Æ The prospectuses for these 4 funds are attached Å 
Appendix A  
FEE INFORMATION 
 
•  Mutual funds charge annual fees to investors. 
 
•  These fees are a preset fraction (the expense ratio) of the fund balance. 
 
•  Your annual fee is approximately equal to:  
          (Your average fund balance) × (Expense ratio) 
 
•  In addition to the expense ratio, some mutual funds charge a one-time fee 
when you purchase shares.  This additional fee is called a front-end load. 
 
•  Other fees may apply.  Please check the fund’s prospectus for more details. 
 
 
TABLE OF FEES 
 
Mutual Fund  Symbol    Expense 
Ratio 
Approximate annual 
fee if your average 




load fee if you 
purchase $10,000 
worth of shares 
Allegiant S&P 500 
Index Fund - Class A  AEXAX    0.59%  $59  2.50%  $250 
Mason Street Index 
500 Stock Fund - Class 
A 
MISAX    0.80%  $80  4.75%  $475 
Morgan Stanley S&P 
500 Index Fund - Class 
A 
SPIAX    0.64%  $64  5.25%  $525 
UBS S&P 500 Index 





If your average balance is $10,000 and the expense  
ratio is 0.42%, then you would pay approximately 
 
     $10,000 × 0.42% = $42 
 
in annual fees to the mutual fund. 
  
Front-End Load  
 
If you purchase $10,000 worth of shares in a fund and the 
front-end load is 2.5%, then you would pay 
 
     $10,000 × 2.5% = $250 
 
in load fees at the time of purchase. 
 
 




As of 12/31/2003 
 
Mutual Fund  Symbol  Average Annual Total Return Since Fund 
Inception
1 
Allegiant S&P 500 Index Fund - Class A AEXAX  1.3%
2 
Mason Street Index 500 Stock Fund - 
Class A  MISAX  5.9%
3 
Morgan Stanley S&P 500 Index Fund - 
Class A  SPIAX  2.5%
4 
UBS S&P 500 Index Fund - Class A  PSPIX  2.5%
5 
1 Includes the effect of fees, expenses, and sales loads 
2 Inception Date: 10/15/1998 
3 Inception Date: 3/31/1997 
4 Inception Date: 09/26/1997 
5 Inception Date: 10/02/1998 
 
Past performance is no guarantee of future results.  
 
Appendix C Please complete this short questionnaire and return it to be eligible for receiving payment. 
 
1. Age:  ______________     
 
2. Gender  (please circle): Male  /  Female   
 
3.  What is the highest level of education listed that you have completed? (Check only one.) 
  
 Some high school 
   High school graduate 
   First year of college 
   Second year of college 
   Third year of college 
   College graduate 
 
4.  In the previous task, you were asked to allocate $10,000 among four different mutual 
funds. How important were the following factors in shaping your final investment 
decision?  (Please check the appropriate boxes.) 












A.  Quality  of  prospectus       
B.  Brand  recognition           
C.  Past  experience  with  fund  companies       
D.  Fund fees, expenses, and loads           
E.  Minimum opening balance 
requirements 
     
F.  Investment  objectives       
G.  Fund performance over the past year           
H.  Fund  performance  since  inception       
I.  Fund performance over a different 
horizon 
     
J.  Customer  service  of  fund       
K.  Desire to diversify across funds           
L.  Other:    _________________________       
CONTINUED ON OTHER SIDE 
Appendix D 5.   How likely is it that you would change your decision if you consulted a professional 
investment advisor? (Please check only one box.) 
 
  Very likely  
  Somewhat likely  
  Not likely 
 
 
6.  Did you look at the funds’ prospectuses to help you make your decision?  
 
  Yes  If so, for how long?  Approximately ___________ minutes 
  No 
 
 
7.  How confident are you that the decision you made is the right one for you? (Please check 
only one box.) 
 
  Very confident  
  Relatively confident 
  Somewhat confident 
  Less than confident 
  Not at all confident 
 
 
8.  How knowledgeable an investor do you consider yourself to be? (Please check only one 
box.) 
 
  Very knowledgeable 
  Relatively knowledgeable 
  Somewhat knowledgeable 
  Less than knowledgeable 
  Not at all knowledgeable 
 
 
9.  Please rate each of the following investments’ riskiness on a scale of 1 to 5.  
  (1 indicates “no risk” and 5 indicates “very high risk.” Circle the appropriate number.) 
 
            No risk         Very high risk 
(a) A large U.S. stock mutual fund    1     2     3     4     5   Don’t know 
(b) A savings account at your bank     1     2     3     4     5   Don’t know 
(c) U.S. corporate bonds  1     2     3     4     5    Don’t know 
(d) Stable value/money market fund  1     2     3     4     5    Don’t know 
(e) Stock of a typical Fortune 500 company   1     2     3     4     5    Don’t know 
(f) An international stock mutual fund  1     2     3     4     5   Don’t know 
(g) An emerging markets stock mutual fund  1     2     3     4     5   Don’t know 
CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE  
10.  What return do you expect the following asset types to earn annually, on average, during 
the next five years? (Please give your best guess. If you expect an asset type to lose 
money on average, write a negative number.) 
  U.S. stocks        _____%     
  U.S. corporate bonds   _____% 
  Money market funds  _____%     
  Stable value funds      _____% 
 
11.  Which of the following types of investments are found in a money market fund? (You 
may check more than one type.) 
 
  Short-term U.S. government bonds 
  Corporate bonds 
  Stocks 
  None of the above 
 
12. Optional:  (You may decline to answer this question with no penalty.) 
 
Highest SAT Math score  ________        Did not take SAT   
Highest SAT Verbal score  ________  OR    Unable to remember 
          Do not wish to answer 
 
 
 
 